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Abstract
A recent paper by Ruge-Murcia [European Economic Review 48 (2004), 91-107] on asymmetric
central bank objectives provides a new perspective on the policy roots of inflation in developed
economies. More precisely, the paper demonstrates that if the distribution of the supply shocks
is normal, then the reduced form solution for inflation implies a positive (or negative) relation
between average inflation and the variance of shocks. We argue that the evidence oﬀered in support
of this hypothesis suﬀers from lack of identification because Phillips curve nonlinearity combined
with quadratic central bank preferences yield the same reduced form solution for inflation. If so,
estimating reduced form for inflation will not be able to discriminate between these models. Yet
they have quite diﬀerent implications for policy. Other, structural, evidence is needed.
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I Introduction
The standard explanation of inflation bias is based on two-way interaction be-
tween policymakers and the rational public within the context of an expectations-
augmented Phillips curve. This conceptual framework relies on the presumption that
policymakers use monetary policy to raise output (or employment) above its normal
level. This explanation generates a reduced form in which inflation depends on the
extent of supply-side distortions or other possible sources of ‘temptation to reflate’.
It has however been questioned by policymakers as well as by some academics on the
grounds of realism (examples include Blinder (1997, 1998)).
Such questioning led to the emergence, since the late nineties, of a new body of
literature that incorporates the possible existence of asymmetries in the objective
functions of central banks - the new inflation bias hypothesis, exemplified by Ruge-
Murcia (2004).1 More precisely, this literature demonstrates that when the central
bank is also expected to engage in stabilization of output (or employment), some
uncertainty about the future state of the economy and asymmetric concerns about
positive and negative output gaps combine to create an inflation bias. Thus, a bias
arises in spite of policymakers targeting the natural rate of output (or unemploy-
1Also see Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) and Nobay and Peel (2003). Moreover, the formulations
used in these papers are suﬃciently flexible to allow for the existence of precautionary demands for
both expansions and for price stability.
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ment).2
Cukierman and Gerlach (2003), among others, provide empirical support for this
view. Specifically, they show that if the distribution of the supply shocks is normal,
then the reduced form solution for inflation implies a positive (or negative) relation
between average inflation and the variance of shocks to output. Thus, the new infla-
tion (or deflation) bias hypothesis implies that the slope parameter in a regression of
average inflation on the variance of the supply shock should be significant.
In this paper we show that reduced form evidence oﬀered in support of the new
inflation (or deflation) bias hypothesis suﬀers from a serious lack of identification.
This is because Phillips curve nonlinearity combined with quadratic central bank
preferences yield the same reduced form solution for inflation. However, the under-
lying motivation for preference asymmetry is very diﬀerent: it lies in some way in
considerations of political economy and of credibility. By implication estimating a
reduced form for inflation will not be able to tell us the true source of any bias. Yet
econometric identification is crucial for designing institutions to combat the problem.
If on the one hand the true source of bias is asymmetry of preferences then a
cure could come simply from instructing the central bank not to act asymmetrically-
2Similarly, during periods of inflation stabilization when the buildup of credibility is a major
concern, policymakers are likely to be more averse to upward deviations of inflation from its target
than to downward deviations. The disinflationary experience of the UK during the second half of
the nineties provides some preliminary support to this view (see Srinivasan et al., 2006).
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an issue that has come up in the context of the European Central Bank’s inflation
target ‘maximum’ of 2%. Clearly on the other hand no such cure is available if the
reason for the bias is Phillips curve nonlinearity. Then the bias will persist for as long
as the Phillips Curve remains nonlinear. It follows that to distinguish among these
alternative hypothesis it is necessary to adduce additional structural evidence either
about central bank preferences or about the economy’s structure. Previous work on
the central bank preference hypothesis has acknowledged (Ruge-Murcia, ibid, p.98)
the similar implications of Phillips Curve nonlinearity; but has failed to recognize the
seriousness of the identification problem this poses. Thus here we carefully explain
the problem and show that it cannot be resolved by reduced form evidence.
In the rest of this paper we briefly set out (section II) Ruge-Murcia’s derivation
of inflation bias from central bank preference asymmetry and then show (section
III) how Phillips curve nonlinearity generates the same reduced form solution for
inflation. Since the bias is proportional to the conditional variance of supply shock,
the model generates testable cross-section and time-series implications. Section IV
provides concluding remarks.
II Asymmetric Central Bank preferences and inflation (or deflation) bias
This section briefly recapitulates Ruge-Murcia’s derivation of inflation bias from
central bank preference asymmetry. The central banker’s preferences over inflation
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and unemployment are represented by the loss function
L(πt, ut) =
µ
1
2
¶
(πt − π?)2 +
µ
φ
γ2
¶¡
eγ(ut−u
?
t ) − γ (ut − u?t )− 1
¢
, (2.1)
where πt is the inflation rate, ut is the rate of unemployment and π? and u?t denote
the targeted rates of inflation and unemployment, respectively. Here φ is a positive
coeﬃcient and γ is a nonzero real number. The targeted unemployment rate is the
expected natural rate of unemployment (unt ):
u?t = Et−1u
n
t . (2.2)
The expectations augmented Phillips curve in terms of unemployment is given by
ut − unt = −λ (πt − πet) + ηt, λ > 0, (2.3)
where πet is the public’s inflation forecast at time t constructed at time t − 1, and
ηt is an aggregate supply disturbance. The public constructs its forecast rationally,
πet = Et−1πt, where Et−1 is the expectation conditional on all information available
at time t− 1.
The central bank has imperfect control over the rate of inflation. In particular
πt = it + ξt, (2.4)
where it is the policy instrument (short-term interest rate) and ξt is the disturbance
term. Since it is chosen at time t−1, the specification relaxes the assumption that the
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central banker has an informational advantage over the public since neither of them
observe the shock at time t− 1. Finally, the structural disturbances of the model (ηt
and ξt) are assumed to be serially uncorrelated, jointly normally distributed with zero
mean, and possibly conditionally heteroskedastic. This assumption allows changes
over time in the volatility of the structural shocks.
The central bank chooses the policy instrument so as to minimize the loss function
in Eq. (2.1) subject to the economic structure given in Eqs. (2.3) and (2.4). This
yields an implicit expression for the instrument it. Substitution of this equation into
(2.4) yields, after some algebra
πt = π? +
µ
λφ
γ
¶µ
e
γ2σ2u,t
2 − 1
¶
+ ξt, (2.5)
where σ2u,t represents the conditional variance of unemployment.3 Finally, lineariza-
tion of Eq. (2.5) yields the precise form of the regression estimated by Ruge-Murcia
(2004) which is,
πt = a0 + a1σ2u,t + ξt, (2.6)
where a0 is a constant intercept and a1 =
λφγ
2
≶ 0. In general, where the central
bank’s preferences are asymmetric, the inflation bias is diﬀerent from zero. The bias
is proportional to the conditional variance of unemployment.4 The sign of the bias
3Since shocks are normal, the distribution of unemployment conditional on Ωt−1 is normal.
Hence, the distribution of exp(γ (ut)) is log normal with conditional mean exp(γ2σ2u,t/2).
4Also note that the variance of the unemployment rate can be related back to the variances of the
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depends on whether γ ≶ 0, an inflation or deflation bias according to the sign of
‘γ’. Thus, the key implication of this equation is that the average rate of inflation
depends positively or negatively on the variance of the unemployment (or variance of
supply shocks).
III Phillips curve nonlinearity and inflation (or deflation) bias
To make the basic point of the paper without introducing unnecessary complica-
tions we modify the expectations augmented Phillips curve by allowing for nonlin-
earity. Such asymmetry has a long empirical and theoretical history. The point is
that with a nonlinear Phillips curve the sacrifice ratio is not independent of the size
of an intended change in inflation- it rises as the economy goes further into reces-
sion. This suggests that inflation should be reduced more when the economy is in an
expansionary mode induced by favourable supply shocks. A nonlinear Phillips curve
thus provides a rationale for asymmetry even when the policymaker’s preferences are
quadratic.
Specifically, we assume that the Phillips curve is linear but the eﬀect of the shock
itself on the position of the trade-oﬀ is nonlinear. We use this formulation as a
tractable representation of nonlinearity in the Phillips curve. A nonlinear Phillips
structural disturbances. As Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) point out, in the absence of anticyclical
policy the variability in the rate of growth of output (or unemployment) and the variance of supply
shocks are positively and strongly correlated. Hence σ2u,t in Eq. (2.6) can be proxied by σ2η,t.
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curve with quadratic central bank preferences does not yield a closed form solution
for inflation and must be evaluated numerically- see Orphanides and Wieland (2000).
However it can be shown numerically that the optimal reaction function will be
nonlinear (see Minford and Srinivasan, 2006), with the approximate form: πt =
π? − a (eγεt − 1). This closed form solution is obtained from the assumption we now
make on the functional form for the Phillips curve, which places the nonlinearity in
the shock mechanism:
yt = α (πt − πet) +
¡
ebεt − 1
¢
, (3.1)
where yt is the output gap in period t, α > 0 and b > 0 are constants and εt the
supply shock is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and possibly
conditionally heteroskedastic. Eq. (3.1) is the short-run Phillips curve which is linear
in the unexpected component of inflation but responds asymmetrically to supply
disturbances. This tractable representation produces similar eﬀects on policy to the
usual (Phillips curve which is nonlinear in the unexpected component of inflation and
linear in shocks) set-up.
The central banker’s preferences over inflation and output are represented by a
quadratic loss function
L(πt, yt) =
1
2
£
(πt − π?)2 + λ (yt)2
¤
, (3.2)
where λ > 0 is the relative weight on output-gap stabilization. The private sector
8
has rational expectations; that is,
πet = Et−1πt. (3.3)
Finally, following Ruge-Murcia (2004) we posit a linear relationship between the
policy instrument and the inflation rate. Thus, the model shares all the basic features
of Ruge-Murcia (2004), and departs instead only in the assumption regarding the
central banker’s preferences and the functional form of the Phillips curve. In this
framework the central bank chooses the policy instrument so as to minimize the loss
function in Eq. (3.2) subject to the economic structure given in Eqs. (3.1) and (3.3).
This yields the following first-order condition with respect to πt:
πt =
µ
1
1 + α2λ
¶¡
π? + α2λπet − αλ
¡
ebεt − 1
¢¢
. (3.4)
In order to make Eq. (3.4) consistent with Eq. (2.6), we linearize the exponential
term above by means of a second-order Taylor expansion around εt = 0. That is,
ebεt u 1 + b (εt) + b
2(εt)2
2
. Substituting this approximation in Eq. (3.4) and taking
expectations conditional upon information available in period t− 1 yields:
πet = π? −
µ
αλb2
2
¶
σ2ε,t, (3.5)
where σ2ε,t denotes the conditional variance of supply shock. Finally, substituting
Eq. (3.5) for πet in Eq. (2.4) yields the reduced form solution for inflation:
πt = a2 + a3σ2ε,t + ξt, (3.6)
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where a2 = π? and a3 = −
³
αλb2
2
´
< 0. Eq. (3.6) is the optimal feedback rule for in-
flation when the Phillips curve is nonlinear. Moreover, this particular functional form
for the Phillips curve implies a deflation bias.5 The intuition for this deflation bias
stems from the asymmetric interest rate-setting behaviour under a convex Phillips
curve whereby policymakers (with a given inflation target) have a greater incentive to
avoid periods of excess demand, as these require larger and more protracted recession
to undo the inflation generated when output is above target.
Thus, both nonlinearity of the Phillips curve and asymmetric preferences imply
the same reduced form solution for inflation. Hence, estimating Eq. (2.6) or Eq. (3.6)
will not be able to tell us what the ‘true’ source of the bias is. Yet this information is
crucial for designing institutions to combat the problem. In order to distinguish these
two theories other, structural, evidence is required. This could be direct evidence on
the structure of central bank preferenses or the Phillips Curve; or it could be indirect
evidence through estimating a full structural model with all cross-equation restrictions
imposed from each theory, then testing between the two structures.
IV Conclusion
5We note that we can get both inflation or deflation bias with a nonlinear Phillips curve. In our
Phillips curve formulation the response of output to shocks is convex. The model in this case predicts
a deflation bias. In contrast, if we had modelled the response of output to shocks to be concave, the
model predicts an inflation bias. Thus, both models (asymmetric preference and nonlinear Phillips
curve) predict an inflation or deflation bias.
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Recent literature on asymmetric central bank objectives provides a new perspec-
tive on the policy roots of inflation in developed economies. Rather than being due
to a systematic attempt to maintain output above potential (or unemployment below
its natural level) this literature raises the possibility that much of the inflationary
bursts experienced by developed countries during the last thirty years were due to
the existence of a precautionary demand for expansions. It also suggests that, during
periods in which the central bank’s resolve to stabilize inflation is strong, like the
second half of the nineties in the UK, the precautionary demand for price stability
may dominate.
In this paper we have argued that the reduced form evidence oﬀered in support
of asymmetric central bank preferences suﬀers from a serious lack of identification.
Specifically, it is argued that Phillips curve nonlinearity combined with quadratic
central bank preferences yield exactly the same reduced form solution for inflation as
asymmetric preferences. A resolution requires structural evidence.
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